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Objectives: To contribute to current discussions about budget impact modeling, two different 
approaches for the impact of a new pharmaceutical product were analyzed: ﬁ  rstly considering 
the impact on annual healthcare expenditures only, and secondly additional inclusion of lost 
insurance premiums due to possible early retirement in patients with chronic diseases.
Methods: The dynamic model calculates the budget impact from two different perspectives: 
(a) the impact on healthcare expenditures and (b) on expenditures as well as on health insur-
ance revenues due to premiums. The latter approach could especially be useful for patients with 
chronic diseases who have higher probabilities of early retirement. Early retirement rates and 
indirect costs were derived from published data. Healthcare premiums were calculated based 
on an average premium and a mean income. Epidemiological input data were obtained from 
the literature. Time horizon was 10 years.
Results: Results in terms of reimbursement decisions of the budget impact analysis varied 
depending on the assumptions made for the insurance premiums, costs, and early retirement rate. 
Sensitivity analyses revealed that in extreme cases the decision for accepting a new pharmaceuti-
cal product would probably be negative using approach (a), but positive using approach (b). 
Conclusions: Depending on the disease and population of interest in a budget impact analysis, 
not only the healthcare expenditures for a health insurance have to be considered but also the 
revenue side for an insurance due to retirement should be included.
Keywords: decision analysis, budget impact, pharmacoeconomics, health economics, health 
insurance
Introduction
The use of economic evaluation in determining resource allocation is well established 
in a number of health services (Drummond and McGuire 2001). There is growing 
recognition that a comprehensive economic assessment of a new healthcare interven-
tion at the time of launch requires both cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) and a budget 
impact analysis (BIA). 
BIA for new pharmaceutical products provides estimates of the likely impact of 
the new drug on healthcare decision-makers short- and longer-term annual budgets. It 
is an essential part of a comprehensive economic assessment of a new pharmaceutical 
product and is increasingly required (National Research Council 1991), along with 
CEA, before national or local formulary approval and/or reimbursement. 
National regulatory agencies such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
in England and Wales (NICE 2004), the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁ  ts Advisory Committee 
(PBAC) in Australia (PBAC 2002), the Co-ordinating OFFICE for Health Technology 
Assessment in Canada (CCOHTA 1997), the French Transparency Committee (Colleges 
Des Économistes De La Santé 2004) and the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁ  ts Board in Sweden 
(Pharmaceuticals Beneﬁ  ts Board 2003) as well as managed care organizations (MCOs) in 
the USA, now require that companies submit estimates of both the cost-effectiveness and Vascular Health and Risk Management 2007:3(3) 332
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the likely impact of the new healthcare interventions on national 
or health plan budgets to support the reimbursement or formulary 
inclusion (Trueman et al 2001).
Standard methods for performing and presenting the results 
of CEAs are well accepted (NICE 2004), but the same progress 
has not been made for BIAs (Kuntz and Weinstein 2002). Several 
factors, which are not generally needed for CEA, should be part 
of a comprehensive BIA including the size of the treated popula-
tion, incidence and prevalence estimations, and market penetra-
tion rates for the new drug as well as for the main comparators. 
A review of the recent literature indicates that there are only a 
limited number of published budget impact analyses (Cairns 
2001) and these vary greatly in the methods used.
It is recommended that a comprehensive approach to budget 
impact estimation be adopted, with the results being presented 
from both a societal perspective as well as from more limited 
perspectives depending on the needs of the decision-maker.
Recently, Trueman et al (2001) have proposed an initial 
framework for standardization of BIAs. 
This paper analyzes the potential impact of early retire-
ment on healthcare payer’s annual budgets due to a chronic 
and progressing disease such as diabetes mellitus. The study 
is ﬁ  rst based on a theoretical analysis before a hypothetical 
new product in diabetes treatment is applied.
Materials and methods
The budget of a healthcare payer like the social insurance 
payers in Germany or the private ones in the US, for instance, 
are mainly dependent on their expenses as well as their rev-
enues (Zweifel and Breyer 1997). The expenses are mainly 
dependent on the development of the diseases of the insureds 
and the related costs whereas the revenue is highly inﬂ  uenced 
by the premium an insured is paying. Once an insured is 
being (early) retired the real amount paid for premiums is 
much lower in comparison to the premiums when an insured 
is working full-time due to the lower income.
The following paragraph shows the theoretical impact 
of early retirement as well as the impact of the drug price 
on the equilibrium equation for a general health insurance. 
The next step is to analyze a hypothetical example with a 
diabetes population.
Methods
The cost of illness, including the treatment costs as well as the 
complication costs due to a given disease, is the main driver 
on the healthcare payer budgets. The calculation of the cost 
of illness comprises the direct costs for complications (CoC) 
and the treatment costs (CoT) for the given diseases i in the 
years t, respectively (with i = 1, .., N and t = 1; …; T). The 
costs of illness (CoI) for n patients are calculated according 
to the following equation E1:
  CoI CoC CoT t ni it
t
T
i
N
=⋅ +
= = ∑ ∑ ()
1 1
 (E1)
Additionally it is assumed that the number of complica-
tions c as well as the severity s of these are the drivers for 
the CoC and the market share for product A MSA, with an 
inﬂ  uence of price for competitors pA+1, as well as the price 
pA for the drugs A (A = 1, …, Z) are the drivers for the CoI. 
Furthermore the numbers of patients n treated in the disease 
population i is mainly dependent on the prevalence ip and 
incidence ii of the disease as well as the mortality rates mi 
within that population. The model is assumed to be dynamic, 
and hence with a higher mortality rate, fewer survivors have 
to be treated. Hence equation (E1) can be rewritten as
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The revenue side R of a healthcare payer balance sheet is 
driven by the premiums h the n insureds are paying.
  Rt ht n
t
T
=⋅
= ∑
1
 (E3)
It is furthermore supposed to take the net present value of 
all revenues into account. Assuming that the income Y of the 
insureds are inﬂ  uencing the real cash ﬂ  ow h of the revenue 
side and the mortality rates have an impact on the number of 
insureds, equation (E3) can be rewritten as following
  Rh Y t nm t
t
T
=⋅
= ∑ () ()
1
 (E4)
Due to the nature of some diseases early retirement is widely 
spread in some population parts (Stock et al 2005). Retirement 
r as a whole has a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the income Y of that 
population. Assuming that no other factors have an impact on 
the income level equation (E4) can be adapted to (E5)
  Rt hYr nm t
t
T
=⋅
= ∑ (() ) ()
1
 (E5)
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For social insurance based systems such as the German healthcare 
system, the insurance companies are mainly non-profit 
organizations (with the exception of the private companies). 
Hence the premiums for the insureds are in an equilibrium 
(without a need for an increase) if the revenue of the payers 
is equal to the costs of these. Assuming that there is only one 
healthcare payer in a given country equations (E2) and (E5) 
represent the equilibrium of the healthcare payer company:
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To simplify the interpretation of (E6) this is rewritten to 
equation (E7)
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First derivations with respect to retirement r and the drug 
price p for a new product c are as follows
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Equation (E8) shows the following: When the retirement 
rate r changes, the income is also changed and this could be 
assumed to be negative. This assumption can be easily ex-
plained: Y decreases when r increases. Certainly in markets 
with perfect competition and private insurance this might 
even be assumed to be positive when assuming an increasing 
demand for a larger amount of insurance coverage, whereas 
this assumption might even not be assumed in the most liberal 
healthcare market, the US, where elderly people or retired 
people are usually then covered by MediCare and no more 
by competing healthcare plans.
When the retirement rate r is increasing the real income 
will be decreased. The second part of equation E8 is showing 
the impact of income Y on the premium function h, which 
could be positive: Due to the higher income it is assumed 
that the real amount of premiums is increasing, when assum-
ing such a healthcare system as the one in Germany where a 
decreasing revenue side can be assumed with an increasing 
retirement rate.
In equation (E9) it is analyzed in which way a new product 
with price pi has an inﬂ  uence on the insurance equilibrium 
equation (E7). The number of patients n is decreasing the 
right-hand side of the equilibrium function (E7) due to the 
sign of the ﬁ  rst derivative. Additionally the costs of treatment 
CoTA are of interest, whereas the sign here is mainly dependent 
on the price level as well as on the market share MSA (ﬁ  rst 
two parts in the bracket). Furthermore the change in costs of 
treatment and market share of the comparators of product A, 
namely A–1 and A+1, have an inﬂ  uence on the sign of that 
ﬁ  rst derivative. Hence the sign of this equation is not clear and 
has to be analyzed case by case. The sign is mainly dependent 
on the price level of the comparator drugs and their market 
share. These ﬁ  ndings are only valid for the case A ≠ 1 and 
A ≠ Z. One special case is an innovative product without any 
comparators (A = 1). Then the costs of treatment are changing 
with the price (increase) and the whole ﬁ  rst derivative with 
respect to pi is becoming negative. This would then have an 
inﬂ  uence on the revenue side which has to be increased to still 
fulﬁ  ll the equilibrium criteria in equation (E7). 
Results
After the theoretical analysis of an impact of early retirement 
and also price changes for a product A, a hypothetical com-
parison follows. The market i is assumed to be the one for 
type 2 diabetes mellitus patients. The comparison is based on 
the epidemiological ﬁ  nding of the UKPDS, where glycemic 
control was analyzed with the options of diet, sulfonylurea, 
metformin, and insulin therapy (UKPDS 1998).
In a usual budget impact analysis two scenarios are com-
pared, which are usually assumed to be a world with the new 
possible treatment option and other available treatments and 
one without that new option, which is usually the environment 
(E6)
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of the current market. The market share is changed due to the 
fact that this new option will be available on the market.
For this hypothetical analysis it is assumed that a pharma-
ceutical company will develop an innovation of a so-called 
oral antidiabetic (OADs), which is assumed to be more 
effective in comparison with the OADs currently available 
on the market. However, the insulins are still the state of the 
art after OADs are no more working properly in the patients 
in terms of HbA1c adjustment.
For the following analysis direct costs for various dia-
betes complications were derived from O’Brien et al (1998) 
whereas it was directly assumed that these US data could 
also be valid for the German circumstance (see Table 1). 
Prevalence data as well as early retirement data were derived 
from literature (Stock et al 2005). The main assumptions 
for this analysis are summarized in Table 2. Assumed com-
plication rates derived from UKPDS 33 are summarized in 
Table 3. The market for diabetes was assumed to consist just 
of insulin drugs and oral antidiabetics (OADs). The efﬁ  cacy 
of the hypothetical new option on the market was assumed 
to be 20% better in terms of outcomes in comparison with 
the standard OADs. Hence the following two scenarios are 
analyzed: The world without the new option with the market 
share distribution in the following way. 38% of patients are 
getting a subcutaneous insulin and the rest of the treated 
patients are getting the OADs. All other patient groups 
treated with any other possibility are not taken into account. 
The market share over time is changed in the way that the 
insulin market will have a market share of 40% after 1 year 
and hence the OAD market is declining by that amount. The 
world with the new option has the same starting point for the 
insulin and the OADs, whereas the new option is assumed 
to have no market share at all. The following three scenarios 
(deﬁ  ned on the view of a pharmaceutical company) are ana-
lyzed for the comparator world including the hypothetical 
new treatment (Table 4):
•  Base Case: The retirement rate was assumed to be 5% for 
both scenarios. Additionally the following market shares 
were assumed:
°  Market share for insulin after 4 years: 45%
°  Market share for OADs after 8 years: 10%
°  Market share for the new option after 8 years: 45%
Table 1 Base assumptions for the three budget impact scenarios
Parameter  Base case scenario  Best case scenario  Worst case scenario
Average yearly income (€)a 35,517  35,517  35,517
Average yearly income lost due to early retirement (€)  14,207  14,207  14,207
Retirement rate for current Tx (%)  5.0  5.0  5.0
Retirement rate for current Tx and new option (%)  5.0  2.5  7.5
Premium (percentage of yearly income)a 14.0  14.0  14.0
Covered population - in both arms  83,000,000  83,000,000  83,000,000
Number of treated patientsa 107,070  107,070  107,070
Prevalence (%)a 6.45  6.45  6.45
Incidence per year  1,000  500  2,000
ain the “Current Tx” and “Current Tx & NEW option” arm.
Table 2 Diabetes-related complication costs derived from literature
Cost item  Costs per event (€)  Source
Hypoglycemia 384  Diabetes Care 1995
Retinopathy/Macular edema  71  O’Brien et al 1998
Blindness in one eye  4365  O’Brien et al 1998
Cataract  2250  Internal expert assumption
Micro-/Macroalbuminuria  78  O’Brien et al 1998
End-stage renal disease  77,735  O’Brien et al1998
Neuropathy  273  O’Brien et al 1998
Peripheral arterial disease  6867  DRG handbook 2000
Diabetic foot syndrome  3421  O’Brien et al 1998
Myocardial infarction  34,597  O’Brien et al 1998
Heart failure  12,038  DRG handbook 2000
Angina pectoris  3102  O’Brien et al 1998
Stroke  50,858  O’Brien et al 1998Vascular Health and Risk Management 2007:3(3) 335
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Table 4 Market share for the three possible treatments over time for the three budget impact scenarios
Market share  Current market   Target market share  Time to reach the 
  share  (Base / Best / Worst)  target
Insulin: Current Txa 38  40  1
OADs: Current Txa 62  60  1
Insulin: Current Tx + new option  38  45 / 30 / 50  4
OADs: Current Tx + new option  62  10 / 0 / 31   8
New option  0  45 / 70 / 19   8
aAssumption: ﬁ  xed market in terms of scenarios.
Table 5 Yearly drug costs (€) for the three pharmaceutical treatment options on the market
Cost item (€; yearly)  Base case scenario  Best case scenario  Worse case scenario
Insulin 286  286  286
Oral antidiabetics (OADs)  89  89  89
New option  1,000  500  1,500
•  Best Case: The retirement rate was assumed to be 2.5% 
for both scenarios. Additionally the following market 
shares were assumed:
°  Market share for insulin after 4 years: 30%
°  Market share for OADs after 8 years: 0%
°  Market share for the new option after 8 years: 70%
•  Worst Case: The retirement rate was assumed to be 7.5% 
for both scenarios. Additionally the following market 
shares were assumed:
°  Market share for insulin after 4 years: 50%
°  Market share for OADs after 8 years: 31%
°  Market share for the new option after 8 years: 19%
The price for subcutaneous insulin was assumed to be €89, 
for the OADs €286 (see Table 5). The base, best, and worst 
case analyses were run within some stratiﬁ  cation groups for 
the incidence cases and drug costs for the new option (see 
Table 1).
The budget impact for the base case analysis, 1000 inci-
dent cases and drug costs of €500, ranged from €58,860,034 
(best case) to €99,108,673 (base case) cumulative after 10 
years (Table 7). Assuming that the premium assumption 
of 14% p.a. was an equilibrium of the costs and the ex-
penses (see equation E7) the difference between the yearly 
premiums of the world with and without the hypothetical 
new drug ranged between 0.0034 and 0.0122, which was 
a proportional difference between 2.3% and 8.9% after 
10 years. It turned out that the direction of the differ-
ence of the yearly premiums and the budget impact result 
would inﬂ  uence the decision makers in the same way. The 
new treatment option is not only more effective and has a 
positive impact on the healthcare payer’s budget (in terms 
of cost reduction), but has also a reduction in the yearly 
premiums as a result due to the improvement of the early 
retirement rate. This conclusion can also be drawn for the 
third sensitivity analyses (drug price: €1500). The only 
scenario where the hypothetical new drug is dominant in 
terms of budget impact and premium change is the analysis 
with an assumed drug price of €500. 
The second analysis was done by taking the same assump-
tions as before but changing the incidence rate from 1000 
new cases per year to 500 new cases per year. For the base 
case analysis (drug costs €500) it can be seen that the budget 
impact is negative which means that the current treatment 
possibilities (insulin and OADs) are cheaper than the current 
treatment inclusive of the hypothetical new treatment (see 
Table 6). But when reviewing the yearly premiums based on 
the early retirement rate and the costs per year, the decision-
maker should go with the new treatment due to lower yearly 
premiums, between 0.0046 (proportional: 2.6%) and 0.0167 
(proportional: 10.0%). The same conclusion can be drawn 
when doing the analysis for a yearly drug price per patient 
of €1500. Interestingly the inﬂ  uence on the decision-maker 
is changed when including a drug price for the hypothetical 
new option to €500. With that price the budget impact is 
improved in terms of cost reduction with the new treatment 
as well as a lower premium per year.
The third analysis was run for the three scenarios 
described above and an incidence rate of 2000 new cases 
per year (see Table 8). Also for this stratiﬁ  cation analysis it 
turns out that the impact of the early retirement rate is much Vascular Health and Risk Management 2007:3(3) 337
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Walzer
higher for the yearly premium calculations than for the budget 
impact. The budget impact would speak in favor of the new 
hypothetical treatment for a price of €500 but not for the 
other two price options, whereas the premiums calculations 
would always lead to the conclusion that the new treatment 
should be reimbursed by the healthcare payer.
Discussion
The dependency of healthcare payers on their revenue based 
on the premiums paid by their insured population and the 
costs mainly inﬂ  uenced by the cost of complications and 
the costs of treatment (pharmaceutical costs) was analyzed 
within a budget impact modeling framework. Across the 
ISPOR members of the Budget Impact Analysis Task Force 
there is currently no consensus on whether the revenue side 
of the healthcare payers should also be taken into account 
within a budget impact analysis (ISPOR 2007). This study 
shows the theoretical implications of a new product if a 
change in the early retirement rate could be expected for a 
new product due to a higher efﬁ  cacy in comparison with the 
standard treatment. The product price as well as the assump-
tions for the early retirement rate can change the equilibrium 
of a revenue-cost premium calculation for a healthcare 
payer as was derived in a theoretical model. Additionally a 
hypothetical comparison in diabetes patients was undergone. 
The theoretical results could be proved by this study. Some 
assumptions had to be done, for instance on the levels of 
drug prices, incidence and prevalence rates, as well as the 
event rates for some complications which were derived from 
a well-known study (UKPDS 1998). In general it turned out 
that the premium differences were always in favor of the new 
option opportunity, which could be due to the assumption of 
a 20% better inﬂ  uence on the complications. The negative 
inﬂ  uence of the new option in terms of budget impact was 
highly dependent on the assumed drug price and the early 
retirement rate.
The weakness of this theoretical study can be seen in 
the following points. The premium calculations are usually 
based on all diseases and hence on all patients as well as on 
the disease-free population of the given healthcare payer. 
Within this hypothetical example it was assumed that only 
one disease area (diabetes) was of interest when analyzing 
the impact on the annual premiums. It was assumed that 
the impact of all other diseases as well as the impact of the 
healthy population is hold constant when comparing the two 
worlds of interest: Current treatment versus current treatment 
and new option. Additionally the impact of these groups 
was assumed to be constant over time and hence no new 
drugs would enter the market for other diseases from which 
a healthcare payer could beneﬁ  t. Also, the early retirement 
rates were held constant over time, which means the impact 
of the new drug option and also the higher early retirement 
risk with a higher age were not taken into account. Within 
such a circumstance it can be seen that a new drug with a 
higher efﬁ  cacy could lead to a beneﬁ  t for the healthcare payer 
with two possibilities: On the one hand the new treatment 
possibility could reduce the costs and could hence result in 
an improvement for the budget impact for some scenarios, 
and on the other hand, which could go along with the budget 
impact argument, the new drug could lower the complication 
rates which would reduce the complication costs and the 
early retirement rate. The last point could lead to a possible 
decrease in the annual premiums due to a higher revenue. 
This last option is not only valid assuming a non-proﬁ  t 
healthcare payer like the social insurance companies in 
Germany, for instance, but also for private insurance com-
panies looking for proﬁ  ts. For the latter the proﬁ  tability 
would increase by the difference of the annual premiums. 
The framework suggested here should be taken into account 
if there is any possibility of early retirement reduction due 
to a more effective treatment possibility. It is recommended 
that sensitivity analysis are not only done with the costs 
but also with the market share over time as well as with the 
incidence rates, based on epidemiological data. Further em-
pirical research on the inﬂ  uence of premiums and costs on 
the decision-making process should be undertaken.
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